We establish an upper bound on the rate of codes for a wiretap channel with public feedback for a fixed probability of error and secrecy parameter. As a corollary, we obtain a strong converse for the capacity of a degraded wiretap channel with public feedback. Our converse proof is based on a reduction of active hypothesis testing for discriminating between two channels to coding for wiretap channel with feedback.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider secure message transmission over a wiretap channel W : X → Y × Z with noiseless, public feedback. For each transmission x ∈ X over W , the receiver observes a random output Y ∈ Y and an eavesdropper observes a correlated side-information Z ∈ Z, with probability W (Y, Z|x). Furthermore, the receiver can send a feedback to the transmitter over a noiseless channel. However, the feedback channel is public and any communication sent over it is available to the eavesdropper. The transmitter seeks to send a message M to the receiver without revealing it to the eavesdropper. For a given probability of error and a given secrecy parameter δ, what is the maximum possible rate C ,δ of a transmitted message?
For a degraded wiretap channel W with no feedback, the wiretap capacity C = inf ,δ C ,δ was established in the seminal work of Wyner [19] where it was shown that
The capacity of a general wiretap channel was established in [3] . Extensions to wiretap channels with general statistics were considered in [4] . The model with feedback considered here was introduced in [8] where it was noted that the availability of a noiseless feedback can enable positive rates of transmission over a wiretap channel with zero capacity (see, also, [10] ). However, the wiretap capacity with feedback remains unknown in general; max P X I (X ∧ Y | Z) constitutes an upper bound on it.
In this paper, we establish a strong version of this bound and show that for + δ < 1 thereby characterizing C ,δ for all 0 < , δ < 1 for a degraded wiretap channel. A partial strong converse for a degraded wiretap channel was established in [11] for a restricted range of , δ. Another strong converse for a degraded wiretap channel for the case when δ → 0 was established, concurrently to this work, in [15] . In this work, we show a strong converse for all values of and δ.
Our proof relies on a slight modification of a recent reduction of hypothesis testing to secret key agreement shown in [17] , [18] . Specifically, we show that a wiretap channel code yields an active hypothesis test for distinguishing between two channels [6] . Consequently, the rate of a wiretap code is bounded above by the rate of the optimum exponent of the probability of error of type II for discriminating a channel W from another channel V such that V (y, z|x) = V 2 (z|x)V 1 (y|z), given that the probability of error of type I is less than + δ. This gives an upper bound on the length of a wiretap code, which leads to the strong converse upon using the characterization of the optimal exponent for channel discrimination derived in [6] . This approach is along the lines of meta-converse of [13] , where a reduction of hypothesis testing to channel coding was used to establish a finiteblocklength converse for the channel coding problem (see, also, [12] and [5, Section 4.6]).
Our main result is given in the next section. Section III and IV contains a review of relevant results in binary hypothesis testing and secret key agreement, respectively. The final section contains a proof of our main result.
II. MAIN RESULT
We describe a generalization of the classic wiretap channel coding problem [19] , [3] that was considered in [8] , [10] , [1] , where, in addition to transmitting over the wiretap channel, the terminals can communicate using a noiseless, public feedback channel from the receiver to the transmitter.
A wiretap code for a discrete 1 memoryless wiretap channel W : X → Y × Z with feedback consists of (possibly randomized) encoder mappings e t : {1, ..., N } × F t → X ,
For a random message M ∼ unif{1, ..., N }, the protocol begins with a feedback F 0 from the receiver at t = 0. Subsequently, at each time instance 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1 the transmitter sends X t = e t (M, F t−1 ) and the channel outputs (Y t , Z t ) Fifty-second Annual Allerton Conference Allerton House, UIUC, Illinois, USA October 1 -3, 2014 with probability W (Y t , Z t |X t ). The receiver observes Y t and sends feedback F t = f t (Y t ), and the eavesdropper observes Z t . The protocol stops with a final transmission X n = e n (M, F n−1 ) over the channel and the subsequent decodingM = d(Y n ) by the receiver. We denote by F the overall feedback communication F 0 , ..., F n−1 .
The mappings
where P − Q 1 denotes the variation distance between P and Q given by
A rate R > 0 is ( , δ)-achievable if there exists an ( 2 nR , n, , δ) wiretap code for all n sufficiently large. The ( , δ)-wiretap capacity C ,δ is the supremum of all ( , δ)achievable rates.
Our main result in an upper bound on C ,δ
For the special case of a degraded wiretap channel W with W (y, z|x) = W 1 (y|x)W 2 (z|y), Theorem 1 yields a strong converse for wiretap capacity.
Corollary 2. For a degraded wiretap channel W ,
Proof. For 0 < < 1 − δ, the result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 and [19] 2 . For 1 − δ ≤ < 1, the converse follows from the strong converse for the capacity of a DMC with feedback (cf. [14] ). Moving to the proof of achievability, it suffices to restrict to + δ = 1. For this case, achievability follows by randomizing between an ( n , 1) wiretap code, n → 0 as n → ∞, and a (1, 0) wiretap codethe randomizing bit is communicated as the public feedback F 0 by the receiver 3 As a preparation for the proof of Theorem 1 given in Section V, we review some results in hypothesis testing and secret key agreement in the next two sections.
III. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Consider a simple binary hypothesis testing problem with null hypothesis P and alternative hypothesis Q, where P and Q are distributions on the same alphabet X . Upon observing a value x ∈ X , the observer needs to decide if the value was generated by the distribution P or the distribution Q. To this end, the observer applies a stochastic test T, which is a conditional distribution on {0, 1} given an observation x ∈ X . When x ∈ X is observed, the test T chooses the null hypothesis with probability T(0|x) and the alternative hypothesis with probability T (1|x) = 1 − T (0|x). For 0 ≤ < 1, denote by β (P, Q) the infimum of the probability of error of type II given that the probability of error of type I is less than , i.e., The following result credited to Stein characterizes the optimum exponent of β (P n , Q n ) where P n = P × ... × P and Q n = Q × ... × Q. Next, we review a problem of active hypothesis testing where the distribution at each instance is determined by a prior action. Specifically, given two DMCs W : X → Y and V : X → Y, we seek to design a transmission-feedback scheme such that by observing the channel inputs, channel outputs, and feedback we can determine if the underlying channel is W or V . Formally, an n-length active hypothesis test consist of (possibly randomized) encoder mappings e t : F t → X , 1 ≤ t ≤ n, feedback mappings f t : Y t → F, 0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, and a conditional distribution T on {0, 1} given X n , Y n , F. On observing X n , Y n , F, we detect the null hypothesis W with probability T (0|X n , Y n , F) and alternative hypothesis V with probability T (1|X n , Y n , F). Analogous to β (P, Q), the quantity β (W, V, n), for 0 ≤ < 1, is the infimum of the probability of error of type II over all n length active hypothesis tests for null hypothesis W and alternative hypothesis V such that the probability of error of type I is no more than .
The following analogue of Stein's lemma for active hypothesis testing was established in [6] (see, also, [14] ). Theorem 4 ([6]). For 0 < < 1,
where W x and V x , respectively, denote the xth row of W and V .
Remarkably, the exponent above is achieved without any feedback, i.e., while feedback is available, it does not help to improve the asymptotic exponent of β (W, V, n).
IV. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
In this section, we review two party secret key (SK) agreement where parties observing random variables X and Y communicate interactively over a public channel to agree on a SK that is concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the communication and a side-information Z.
Formally, the parties communicate using an interactive
The following upper bound on the number of values k taken by an ( , δ)-SK K was shown in [17] , [18] : Theorem 5 ([17] , [18] ). For 0 ≤ , δ, + δ < 1, let random variables K,K, and Z be such that P K =K ≤ and
where P unif denotes a uniform distribution on k values. Then, for every 0 < η < 1 − − δ and every Q KKZ = Q K|Z QK |Z Q Z , log k ≤ − log β +δ+η (P KKZ , Q KKZ ) + 2 log 1 η .
V. PROOF OF MAIN RESULT
We present a converse result that applies for every fixed n and is asymptotically tight, giving the strong converse result of Theorem 1.
Theorem 6. For 0 ≤ , δ, + δ < 1, given an (N, n, , δ)wiretap code, we have log N ≤ − log β +δ+η (W, V, n) + 2 log 1 η , for all 0 < η < 1 − − δ and all channels V : X → Y × Z such that V (y, z|x) = V 2 (z|x)V 1 (y|z).
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 follows form Theorems 6 and 4 upon noting that for W (y, z|x) = W 2 (z|x)W 1 (y|z, x)
where P XY Z is given by P X W .
We need the following result to prove Theorem 6.
Lemma 7. For a wiretap channel V : X → Y × Z such that V (y, z|x) = V 2 (z|x)V 1 (y|z), a random message M , and a wiretap code, letM = d(Y n ) and F be the corresponding feedback. Then, the induced distribution Q MM Z n F satisfies factorization condition
Proof of Lemma 7. Denote by U x and U y , respectively, the local randomness at the transmitter and the receiver, and by F t the feedback (F 0 , ..., F t ). Thus, the encoder mapping e t is a (deterministic) function of (M, U x , F t−1 ) and the feedback mapping f t is a (deterministic) function of (Y t , U y ). The proof entails a repeated application of the fact that conditionally independent random variables remain so when conditioned additionally on an interactive communication (cf. [16] ) and is completed by induction. Specifically, note first that Q M UxUy|F0 = Q M Ux|F0 Q Uy|F0 since (M, U x ) and U y are independent and F 0 is an interactive communication. Under the induction hypothesis
where the first equality and inequality follow since Y t and Z t , respectively, are outputs of V 1 for input Z t and V 2 for input X t , and the second equality holds since X t = e t (M, U x , F t−1 ), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. Given an (N, n, , δ) wiretap code, a message M ∼ unif{1, ..., N } and its decoded valuê M = d(Y n ) satisfy the conditions for Theorem 5 with K = M,K =M , and Z = (Z n , F). Letting Q MM Z n F be the distribution on (M,M , Z n , F) when the underlying channel is V , by Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 we get log N ≤ − log β +δ+η (P MM Z n F , Q MM Z n F ) + 2 log 1 η .
Note that a test for the simple binary hypothesis testing problem for P MM Z n F and Q MM Z n F along with the wiretap code constitutes an active hypothesis test for W and V . Therefore, − log β +δ+η (P MM Z n F , Q MM Z n F ) ≤ − log β +δ+η (W, V, n), which completes the proof.
